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LOCO LABELS AND MARKETING
MADNESS: IMPROVING HOW CONSUMERS
INTERPRET INFORMATION IN THE
AMERICAN FOOD ECONOMY
Margaret Sova McCabe
Don’t you hate that dragging feeling at the end of a long
workday—tired, hungry, drained, and wishing for a four-star
dinner that won’t make you feel guilty? One night, knowing I
would not be eating that dinner, I settled on a quick trip to the
grocery for at least a nutritious and eco-friendly meal. I scanned
the aisles looking for a decent dinner that could be made quickly at
home. In less than ten minutes I was in line and feeling great
because my basket was laden with purchases prudent for both me,
physically, and for the environment. In my basket were Kashi pesto
pasta (the box said ―all natural‖ and had healthy whole grain
goodness), organic salad greens (although in a cellophane bag,
the no pesticides claim made me feel good), light dressing (low fat,
of course), organic fat free milk (enough said), and some Late July
dark chocolate cookies (at least they were organic!). While I
thought I could have had a bit less processed food, at least the
choices were responsible—claims of whole grains, all natural, and
pesticide free abounded.
As I waited in the checkout line, I smugly surveyed the basket
of the man in front of me—Mr. Conventional, I decided to call him.
He had steak and potato canned soup (people really eat that?),
Margaret Sova McCabe is a Professor of Law at Franklin Pierce Law
Center in Concord, New Hampshire. The author thanks Professors Sophie
Sparrow, Chris Johnson, and Thomas J. Field Jr. and Assistant Dean Mary
Sheffer for their helpful comments on drafts of this article. I am grateful to
Natalia Pence for her excellent research assistance. The author also appreciates
Pierce Law‘s support for this work.
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some bagged iceberg salad (isn’t that just water?), Greek salad
dressing (did he know how much fat that had?), store brand whole
milk (ditto), and Oreos (ok, I love Oreos). ―What a nutritional
nightmare,‖ I thought to myself, feeling even better about my
healthy choices.
When I got home, my husband commented that he hoped I had
picked up something good for my late dinner. Well, I launched into
my healthy choice speech—organics, whole grains, pesticide free,
antibiotic free! I even recounted my observations about Mr.
Conventional. My husband, who is the pragmatist in the marriage,
eyed me (and my receipt for $19.95) skeptically. ―How do you
know you made out so much better?‖ he asked (I think he was
feeling defensive). I quickly pointed out the labels—whole grains,
antibiotic free, low fat! He just laughed and said something about
me being ―a marketing department’s dream.‖
As a wife and a lawyer, I prefer not to be wrong. While
microwaving the pasta, I set about proving to my husband that I
had not succumbed to mere marketing madness or crazy labeling
schemes. And wouldn’t you know, there wasn’t much difference
between Mr. Conventional and me.1 My purchases cost $19.95.
And, if I ate only the serving sizes, I would consume 605 calories,
1545 mg sodium, 19.5 g fat, and 32 g sugar. Mr. Conventional? He
paid $13.17. Assuming he ate only the serving sizes, he would
consume 625 calories, 1465 mg sodium, 32.5 g fat, 34 g sugar.
There was not much difference, except his wallet was in slightly
better shape.
These numbers did not stack up in my favor. Sure, I had fewer
fat calories and overall calories, but not by much! I spent more,
but for what? Deflated about my feel-good grocery store trip, I
started thinking like a lawyer about my purchases. What shaped
my perceptions? What food information did I really know? What
laws regulated this information? And, how about Mr.
Conventional? How did he make his choices? Could we both have
made better choices if we had more information?

1

See Appendix A infra for a breakdown of the cost and nutritional
information for the purchases.
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHY CARE ABOUT FOOD LABELS?
Most Westerners eat primarily processed foods.2 Since the
manufacturers of these foods prepare much of what America eats,
consumers rely on labels to determine what they are consuming.
The purpose of these labels is three-fold: (1) providing health,
safety, and economic information; (2) protecting consumers from
deceptive or fraudulent marketing; and (3) promoting fair
economic competition and marketing.3 America‘s growing obesity
epidemic, however, signals lawmakers, manufacturers, and
consumers that the country is making poor dietary choices despite
access to nutritional information through labels.
To improve the efficiency of the food economy 4—and
consequently public and environmental health—lawmakers, with
the support of manufacturers and consumers, should make two
principal changes to current labeling policies. The Federal
government should: (1) adopt front-of-package, simplified nutrient
labeling clearly cuing consumers about products‘ healthfulness or
lack thereof, and (2) make greater use of marketing logos to
disclose product production methods, particularly when the food
has special attributes such as organic production or the absence of
genetically engineered ingredients. Taking these steps would
provide consumers with more information, and with more
information consumers would likely make more informed
purchases. As a result, manufacturers would be able to make
2

See MARION NESTLE, WHAT TO EAT 12 (2006); MICHAEL POLLAN, IN
DEFENSE OF FOOD 106–14 (2008); see generally RAJ PATEL, STUFFED &
STARVED 1–6 (2007); ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 3–10 (2002).
3
ELISE GOLAN ET AL., U.S. DEP‘T OF AGRIC., ECONOMICS OF FOOD
LABELING, (2001), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer793/
AER793.pdf; Edna Einsiedel, Consumers and GM Food Labels: Providing
Information or Sowing Confusion?, 3 AG. BIO FORUM 231, 231 (2000),
available at http://www.agbioforum.org/v3n4/v3n4a09-einsiedel.pdf.
4
For the purposes of this article, I use the term ―food economy‖ to refer to
the transactional relationships between food producer, food consumer, and
government as regulator. See generally Marc T. Law, The Origins of State Pure
Food Regulation, 4 J. ECON. HIST. 1103 (2003) (hypothesizing that 19th Century
food laws were motivated by the desire to address asymmetric information
between producers and consumers).
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products that consumers demand, rather than developing products
and generating demand through marketing. The continuation of
poor consumer choices results in an inefficient food economy that
promotes consumption, regardless of health consequences.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) controls the most
meaningful food label and marketing information5 for average
consumers. As is often the case in areas of government regulation,
the agency serves as the initial information broker—it mandates
what labels must disclose to consumers and how that disclosure
takes place, as well as prohibits certain disclosures or claims. 6 In
this way, the government interferes with what would otherwise be
a free market. Of course, there are compelling reasons for this,
such as public health, safety, and moral concerns.7
The danger, however, is the resulting imbalance known to
economists as ―asymmetric information.‖ 8 This information
5

E.g., Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 341
(2006) (―Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary such action will promote
honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers, he shall promulgate
regulations fixing and establishing for any food, under its common or usual
name so far as practicable, a reasonable definition and standard of identity, a
reasonable standard of quality, or reasonable standards of fill of container.‖);
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat.
2353 (1990).
6
See Christine Moorman, A Quasi Experiment to Assess the Consumer and
Informational Determinants of Nutrition Information Processing Attributes, 15
J. PUB. P. & MKTG. 28, 29 (1996) (analyzing the effect of mandated food label
information on consumer choices); Christine Moorman & Linda L. Pierce,
Consumer Policy and Consumer Segment Interactions, 8 J. PUB. P. & MKTG.
181, 182–83 (1989) (providing specific examples of Federal Trade Commission
approaches to regulating consumer information); see generally GEORGE J.
BENSTON, REGULATING FINANCIAL MARKETS (1999) (analyzing and critiquing
how the government regulates the flow of information between consumers and
the financial services industry and making proposals for more consumer
friendly, less costly reforms).
7
See GOLAN, supra note 3, at 1 (―In recent years, government intervention
in labeling has begun to target a new purpose, namely, influencing individual
consumption choices to align them with social objectives.‖); S. Andrew
Starbird, Moral Hazard, Inspection Policy, and Food Safety, 87 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 15, 16 (2005) (noting that imperfect information leads to less food
safety).
8
―Asymmetric information‖ is a theory that explains marketplace behavior.
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imbalance in turn creates the phenomenon of adverse selection,
whereby consumers select low quality goods due to incomplete or
dishonest information. 9 This article argues that the current law and
policies of our food economy have enabled the development of ―an
adverse selection of low-quality products,‖ at least from public
health and consumer choice perspectives, in significant portions of
the food economy. 10
In 2001, three economists won the Nobel Prize for their work in this area:
George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz. Their prize-winning work:
extended the theory when they augmented [it] with the realistic
assumption of asymmetric information: agents on one side of the
market have much better information than those on the other side.
Borrowers know more than the lender about their repayment prospects;
the seller knows more than buyers about the quality of his car; the CEO
and the board know more than the shareholders about the profitability
of the firm; policyholders know more than the insurance company
about their accident risk; and tenants know more than the landowner
about their work effort and harvesting conditions. More specifically,
Akerlof showed that informational asymmetries can give rise to
adverse selection on markets. Due to imperfect information on the part
of lenders or prospective car buyers, borrowers with weak repayment
prospects or sellers of low-quality cars crowd out everyone else from
the market. Spence demonstrated that under certain conditions, wellinformed agents can improve their market outcome by signaling their
private information to poorly informed agents. The management of a
firm can thus incur the additional tax cost of dividends to signal high
profitability. Stiglitz showed that an uninformed agent can sometimes
capture the information of a better-informed agent through screening,
for example by providing choices from a menu of contracts for a
particular transaction. Insurance companies are thus able to divide their
clients into risk classes by offering different policies, where lower
premiums can be exchanged for a higher deductible.
Nobelprize.org, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory
of Alfred Nobel 2001, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/Laureates
/2001/public.html (providing additional summaries of Akerlof, Spence, and
Stigltiz‘s work with citation to their major publications) (last visited Apr. 5,
2009).
9
George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 463–95 (1970); Nobelprize.org, supra
note 8 (―[T]he information problem can either cause an entire market to collapse
or contract it into an adverse selection of low-quality products.‖).
10
See NESTLE, supra note 2, at 19–20 (discussing ways in which current
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A. The Label Playing Field

Consumers navigate a complicated and highly regulated world
of food labeling and marketing. Law shapes not only the
information on packaging, but also how manufacturers formulate
the food within the package. Three key agencies play central roles
in administering these laws in the United States: the FDA, 11 the
United States Department of Agriculture (―USDA‖), 12 and the
Federal Trade Commission (―FTC‖).13 Once government interferes
with a consumer market, no matter how legitimate that interference
may be, it has an ongoing obligation to stay attuned to science,
public health trends, and consumer preferences as they change over
time. When government fails to do this, markets become
increasingly inefficient and ultimately economically and socially
unhealthy.
Since the inception of food labeling regulation, the FDA has
set some of the most informative regulations in the world for label
disclosure of sodium, sugars, and fats. 14 In the United States,
manufacturers must provide this and other food content
information primarily on the ―nutrition information‖ panel of the
package.15 The FDA also permits the inclusion of nutritional
claims intended to convince the consumer a particular product is
healthful. 16 Examples of these claims include ―low fat,‖ ―low
sodium,‖ ―reduced cholesterol,‖ and ―lite.‖17

food economy encourages purchasing of processed foods).
11
This article focuses on the FDA‘s authority under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006).
12
This article focuses on the USDA‘s authority under the Organic Food
Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6522 (2006).
13
This article focuses on the relationship between FDA and USDA
standards and complaints brought before the Federal Trade Commission. See
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006).
14
FDA Food Labeling Rules, 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.1–101.108 (2009).
15
FDA Nutrition Labeling of Food, 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2009).
16
FDA Specific Requirements for Health Claims Rules, 21 C.F.R.
§§ 101.70–101.83 (2009).
17
FDA Specific Requirements for Nutrient Content Claims, 21 C.F.R.
§§ 101.54–101.69 (2009).
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Despite having some of the best nutritional information in the
world on labels, however, America‘s obesity, diabetes, metabolic
syndrome, and heart disease rates have skyrocketed.18 This
phenomenon indicates that the American food economy‘s
regulatory underpinnings may be promoting an information
imbalance with negative consequences for public health. 19
The FDA and USDA are easy targets to blame for America‘s
diet going awry—they have a history of yielding to industry
lobbying and regulating in ways perceived to promote the
processed food industry.20 Although it is the consumer who
chooses what to buy,21 it seems unfair to blame consumers for poor
18

Studies clearly establish the prevalence of obesity and its related
disorders in American society. See NAT‘L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (CDC), NAT‘L HEALTH & NUTRITION
EXAMINATION STUDY (NHANES), PREVALENCE OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY
AMONG ADULTS: UNITED STATES, 2003–2004, http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/products/pubs/pubd/hestats/overweight/overwght_adult_03.htm
(last
visited Apr. 5, 2009); CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (CDC), U.S.
OBESITY TRENDS 1985–2007, http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/
trend/maps/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2009); CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (CDC), OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY, http://www.cdc.gov/nccdp
hp/dnpa/obesity/index.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) (listing the many diseases
and health conditions for which obese individuals are at an increased risk).
19
There are many other examples that are beyond the scope of this article.
One of the most obvious indications that there are serious market problems is
the current world food crisis. One can only imagine whether the crisis could
have been avoided if people better understood the national and global food
economy. See generally PATEL, supra note 2.
20
MICHELE SIMON, APPETITE FOR PROFIT 143, 154–56 (2006) (―[W]hen it
comes to solving the nation‘s epidemic of diet-related diseases, Uncle Sam is
more aligned with Big Food than with the citizens it‘s supposed to represent.‖);
see also PATEL, supra note 2, at 108–17 (―[I]f we look at the sums donated in
the US political system . . . we see that the top four companies in many sectors
of the food system are responsible for more than half the political
contributions.‖).
21
See SIMON, supra note 20, at 22. When discussing the problem food
manufacturers have in acknowledging the rates of diabetes, heart disease, and
other diet related health problems Simon notes:
So, many food corporations, trade associations, and industry front
groups are adopting an intermediary approach: admitting there‘s a
problem but laying the blame elsewhere—with the individual. Call it
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choices when they are arguably acting on imperfect information
about our food. The current regulatory scheme creates labels that
emphasize the positives where possible, yet are nearly silent about
the negatives. This scheme, of course, makes sense given our
capitalist emphasis on consumption and the marketing required to
ensure goods are consumed. 22
However, food is not simply a commodity, a good to be
manufactured and sold. Science has undeniably linked the quality
of human diet to human health. 23 Additionally, while skeptics
remain, science has linked our agricultural practices to the quality
of our environment.24 Given the human health and environmental
impacts consumer food choices have, food labels—especially
processed food labels—should strive for more ―perfect‖
information. 25 Without better information, consumers are misled
the ―personal responsibility‖ strategy. The line of reasoning goes like
this: it‘s up to each individual to make ―better‖ choices at supermarkets
and restaurants . . . [c]onsumers who are having difficulty figuring out
the ―right‖ options for healthier living are simply in need of ―better
education‖—which food manufacturers and PR mavens are happy to
supply, but of course only in the most corporate friendly ways.
Id.
22

That is not to say that capitalism cannot successfully address
environmental or health issues. See generally GARY HIRSHBERG, STIRRING IT UP
(2008).
23
See sources cited supra note 2 (discussing the relationship between
human health and diet).
24
See Donald T. Hornstein, The Road Also Taken: Lessons from Organic
Agriculture for Market-and Risk-Based Regulation, 56 DUKE L.J. 1541, 1546–47
(2007) (When analyzing the ―emergence of a cause-based approach to
environmental reform that seeks fundamental changes in production systems or
human behavior to prevent environmental harms from arising in the first place,‖
Hornstein draws on Rachel Carson‘s Silent Spring, which urged farmers and
others to forgo the arrogance of controlling nature in favor of agriculture that is
―based on understanding of the living organisms [farmers] seek to control, and
of the whole fabric of life to which these organisms belong.‖ RACHEL CARSON,
SILENT SPRING 278 (First Mariner Books ed. 2002)).
25
See, e.g., Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. CV-05-01278, 2008 WL
5273731, at *4 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2008) (―[W]e do not think that the FDA
requires an ingredient list so that manufacturers can mislead consumers and then
rely on the ingredient list to correct those misinterpretations and provide a shield
for liability for the deception. Instead, reasonable consumers expect that the
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and our food economy becomes inefficient. 26
B. Informing Labels: Science and Marketing
This article addresses two examples of the ongoing struggle to
find the proper balance between government regulation, reliable
science, and consumers‘ demand for information. The examples—
the prolonged debate over salt‘s designation as a ―safe‖ food
additive and the tension over the National Organic Program—
illustrate that the balance of information and regulation is not yet
optimal. Furthermore, science and public health play key roles in
policy review and form the foundation of label policy. Government
must also consider that other emerging consumer concerns beyond
food safety, such as environmental impact, animal welfare, and
social justice for workers and the poor, are playing increasingly
important roles in food labeling policy making. 27
A label‘s front panel is prime real estate—the place to grab the
consumer. Government and the market can achieve a better
information balance by providing more ―perfect‖ label information
on this panel. To better optimize food label regulations, the FDA
could follow the United Kingdom‘s lead and implement ―negative
labels‖ that flag foods high in salt, sugar, and/or fat with amber or
red light symbols. 28 Similarly, the FDA and USDA could improve
the information balance by increasing transparency about the
processes underlying label designations such as ―USDA
Organic.‖29

ingredient list contains more detailed information about the product that
confirms other representations on the packaging.‖).
26
See supra notes 7–8.
27
See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525,
534 (2004) (noting that ―process preferences can be expected to capture the
displaced moral and political sentiments of individuals who have been
encouraged to regard the market as a more sure route to self-expression and
efficacious activity than traditional public channels‖). See generally PATEL,
supra note 2.
28
See infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 113–22 and accompanying text.
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Consumers make their food choices in the grocery store, which
also plays a role in shaping purchasing decisions. Accordingly,
stakeholders such as food manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers
should also consider marketplace innovations that operate without
regulation to promote more informed food purchases. Such
innovation requires the grocery industry taking matters into its own
hands, as one supermarket chain has already done by providing
supplemental food information on the grocery shelves to apprise
the consumer of ―negative‖ information. 30 This approach could be
expanded to include the redesign of grocery stores around health,
rather than food category. For example, grocery stores could
design ―green light‖ aisles populated with minimally processed
foods, or those low in sugar, salt and fat. To innovate, however,
stakeholders also need to understand where our labeling policies
can be improved. This article offers two instructive examples and
then makes recommendations about learning from those
experiences.
Part I of this article examines recent FDA public hearing
proceedings, upon petitions for review, to revisit the Agency‘s
designation of salt as ―generally regarded as safe‖ under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetics Act. This example illustrates how
complicated regulating one food additive can be and how the
FDA‘s slow response to such issues require America to take a
fresh look at communicating information about processed food
ingredients to consumers.
Part II examines how the National Organic Program (NOP)
uses niche marketing to help consumers find foods produced
without antibiotics or pesticides. While NOP is an innovative
program that promotes an agriculture system that many view as
sustainable and healthful, critics also claim that it erodes ―true‖
organics. There is support for such criticism, as the program
engenders consumer confusion in the marketplace.31 For example,
30

Hannaford Corporation uses the Guiding Stars Rating System to provide
additional information to consumers about how to rate the healthfulness of
products. Hannaford, What is Guiding Stars?, http://www.hannaford.com/
Contents/Healthy_Living/Guiding_Stars/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2009);
see also infra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
31
See Amanda Thomas, Synthetic Materials and Organic Foods, 24 Agric.
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many average consumers do not know that organic cookies contain
many of the same ingredients as conventional cookies.
Accordingly, NOP illustrates an innovative way of providing better
information to consumers, although the USDA must work harder
to educate consumers about the true meaning of its organic
marketing seal.
Part III makes suggestions for innovative, effective labeling
schemes that will promote more efficient food markets. If
consumers want to eat ―healthy‖ and ―natural‖ foods, our
regulatory system should allow for that. Similarly, the system
should allow for consumers to make food purchasing decisions
based on taste preferences alone, but with fuller disclosure of the
negative personal, public, and environmental health consequences
of those decisions.
I. SALT
[I]n all ages salt has been invested with a significance far
exceeding that inherent in its natural properties, interesting
and important as these are. Homer calls it a divine
substance, Plato describes it as especially dear to the Gods,
and we shall presently note the importance attached to it in
religious ceremonies, covenants and magical charms. That
this should have been so in all parts of the world and in all
times shows that we are dealing with a general human
tendency and not with any local custom, circumstance or
notion.32
Given this grand description of salt (sodium chloride), what
should we make of the fact that Mr. Conventional‘s soup contains
41% of the recommended daily allowance of sodium—a whopping
82% if he consumes the entire can? Should consumers be
concerned that the FDA recently held a public hearing 33 to revisit
L. Update 1, 3 (2007) (citing 7 C.F.R. § 205.606).
32
MARK KURLANSKY, SALT, A WORLD HISTORY 2–3 (2002) (quoting
Ernest Jones‘ 1912 essay on ―the human obsession with salt‖).
33
Salt and Sodium, 72 Fed. Reg. 59,973 (proposed Oct. 23, 2007) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 86) (announcing a public hearing and petition to revise
the regulatory status of salt and establish food labeling requirements for it).
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its sodium policy? The hearing, called in response to a petition to
review salt‘s designation as ―generally regarded as safe‖ (GRAS)
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act,34 is an important
chapter in the American story of food labeling.
Salt serves as a prominent example of how the current
regulatory system conditions consumers to look for signals that a
product is ―healthy‖ and the consumer should buy it. However,
what we really need is a more balanced system that allows
consumers to make a decision not to purchase, as easily as to
purchase. While this may seem antithetical to the modern
American food economy (and it probably is), only with full
disclosure of a product‘s attributes can we hope to have a food
economy that functions efficiently by prompting informed
purchases. 35

34

21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 348 (2006). When a substance is classified as GRAS
under the FDCA, it can be added to foods without pre-market review. In contrast
to GRAS, the law defines ―food additive‖ as:
any substance the intended use of which results or may reasonably be
expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component
or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food (including any
substance intended for use in producing, manufacturing, packing,
processing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting, or holding
food; and including any source of radiation intended for any such use),
if such substance is not generally recognized, among experts qualified
by scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having
been adequately shown through scientific procedures (or, in the case of
a substance used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through either
scientific procedures or experience based on common use in food) to be
safe under the conditions of its intended use . . . .
21 U.S.C. § 321(s).
35
Certainly, the purpose of the FDCA, supra note 5, provides a touchstone
for the FDA to revisit issues such as salt if public health data can support the
Secretary‘s determination that consumers are not getting ―fair‖ information
about a product‘s attributes. Individual manufacturers may not be at fault in
terms of providing ―unfair‖ information—it may be that consumption patterns
(as discussed by journalists such as Pollan and experts such as Nestle, supra
note 2) change in a way that makes a GRAS designation unwise.

MCCABE_6-5-09

6/6/2009 12:46 PM

LOCO LABELS AND MARKETING MADNESS

505

A. Is Salt Safe?
Many scientists agree that excessive salt consumption has dire
health consequences for most humans,36 yet the law classifies it as
―safe.‖37 Further at odds with the GRAS classification is the
FDA‘s permission to manufacturers to market foods with health
claims such as ―low sodium‖ or ―sodium free.‖38 Thus, while
consumers who seek low sodium products may find them, we are
generally led to assume that there are no negative health effects of
salt consumption.
Public health experts increasingly blame salt for the increased
risk of heart disease and stroke worldwide. 39 In the United States,
36

Compare WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REDUCING SALT INTAKE IN
POPULATIONS (2006), available at http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/red
ucingsaltintake_EN.pdf [hereinafter WHO SODIUM REPORT] (concluding that
scientific literature supports the need for government policies for immediate
reduction in the world food supply to reduce heart disease and stroke) and
Nancy R. Cook et al., Long-term Effects of Dietary Sodium Reduction on
Cardiovascular Disease Outcomes: Observational Follow-up with the Trials of
Hypertension Prevention, 334 BRIT. MED. J. 885 (2007), available at
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/rapidpdf/bmj.39147.604896.55v1 (concluding that
sodium reduction may also reduce long term risk of cardiovascular disease),
with Hillel W. Cohen et al., Sodium Intake and Mortality in the NHANES II
Follow-up Study, 119 AM. J. MED. 275 (2006) (scientific study noting that
evidence ―linking sodium intake to mortality outcomes is scant and
inconsistent‖).
37
An analysis of GRAS classification is beyond the scope of this article.
For the reader unfamiliar with GRAS standards, it is essential to understand that
it means either: (1) ―the scientific data and information about the use of a
substance must be widely known and there must be a consensus among qualified
experts that those data and information establish that the substance is safe under
the conditions of its intended use,‖ or (2) ―[f]or a substance used in food before
1958, a GRAS determination can be made through experience based on common
use in food. [That is,] . . . a substantial history of consumption in food by a
significant number of consumers.‖ Paulette Gaynor & Sebestian Cianci, FDA,
Regulatory Report: FDA’s GRAS Notification Program Works, FOOD SAFETY
MAG., Dec.–Jan. 2005–2006, available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/
grasov2.html; see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 170.30(c), (f).
38
FDA Specific Requirements for Nutrient Content Claims, supra note 17.
39
See WHO SODIUM REPORT, supra note 36, at 21–22 (noting various
European groups and companies trying to reduce levels of salt in food content).
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the American Medical Association sounded the regulatory alarm in
2006 when it suggested that the FDA remove salt‘s GRAS
classification.40 However, this recent spate of attention is only the
latest chapter in the effort to regulate salt in processed foods.
Health and consumer activists‘ demands for closer sodium
regulation, while ongoing for thirty years, have largely failed. This
failure suggests either that the government has not kept up with the
science showing that excess dietary sodium is detrimental to
human health, despite a legal process to review the safety of GRAS
substances, or worse, that the government has allowed food
industry lobbying to supersede science.41
B. Regulatory History 1958–2006
Salt‘s modern regulatory history commenced in 1958, when the
Food Additives Amendment of 1958 grandfathered salt as a
substance ―generally regarded as safe.‖42 This classification means
that manufacturers are free to add salt to their products as desired,
rather than it being regulated as a ―food additive‖ requiring premarket clearance procedures.43 In 1969, the FDA began its
systematic review of all food ingredients previously listed as
GRAS without a detailed scientific review, including salt. 44 The
FDA contracted with the Federation of American Societies of
Experimental Biology (FASEB) to evaluate salt‘s safety. 45 A
40

Salt and Sodium, 72 Fed. Reg. 59,973, 59,976 (proposed Oct. 23, 2007)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 86) (noting that at its July 2006 annual meeting
the American Medical Association issued a report seeking to remove salt‘s
GRAS designation).
41
Another potential rationale for the FDA‘s failure to revise sodium
standards is simply that it has not been able to allocate resources to the problem,
given other regulatory demands on the agency.
42
21 U.S.C. § 321; see also FDA, History of the GRAS List and SCOGS
Reviews (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/opas
cogh.html
43
See 21 U.S.C. § 321(s). Indeed, some FDA regulations require salt as an
ingredient in certain branded food, such as cheese. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 133.06
(2007).
44
21 C.F.R. §§ 170.30(e)–(f) (1983).
45
GRAS Safety Review of Sodium Chloride, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,590, 26,591
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decade later, the FASEB reported to the FDA:
[I]t is the prevalent judgment of the scientific community
that the consumption of sodium chloride in the aggregate
should be lowered in the United States. The Select
Committee agrees and favors development of the
guidelines for restricting the amount of salt in processed
foods, a major contributor of dietary sodium. Adequate
labeling of the sodium content of foods would help meet
these objectives.46
In 1978, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI)
petitioned the FDA in an effort to turn the FASEB‘s findings into
mandatory regulation, rather than relying on manufacturers‘
voluntary salt reductions. 47 The FDA denied the petition as
substantively moot, noting that between 1978 and 1982, the agency
issued its core sodium policy and amendments addressing the
FASEB report.48 Dissatisfied that the FDA adopted voluntary
guidelines and that the core sodium policy failed to include
meaningful regulation, the CSPI next sued the FDA. 49 The district
court upheld the FDA‘s discretion to deny the CSPI‘s original
petition.50 Specifically, the court ruled that FDA voluntary labeling
measures contained in its 1982 policy were adequate under the
law, and that the ―the FDA should be given the opportunity to test
these methods to determine if food manufacturers will provide
sodium content labeling and lower the amount of sodium in

(June 18, 1982).
46
Id. at 26,592. Oddly, the report goes on to note that the scientific
evidence at the time was inconclusive as to salt‘s effect on a ―significant
proportion of the public when it is used at levels that are now current and in the
manner now practiced.‖ Id. at 26,592.
47
See Salt and Sodium, 72 Fed. Reg. 59,973, 59,975 (proposed Oct. 23,
2007) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 86); Center for Science in the Public
Interest v. Novitch, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 38,275 (D.D.C. June 11,
1984), available at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/salt_lawsuit.pdf.
48
Salt and Sodium, 72 Fed. Reg. at 59,975.
49
Center for Science in the Public Interest v. Novitch, Food Drug Cosm. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 38,275 (D.D.C. June 11, 1984), available at http://cspinet.org/new
/pdf/salt_lawsuit.pdf.
50
Id.
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processed foods voluntarily.‖ 51 This decision paved the way for
another two and half decades of half-measures and regulatory
leniency that continue the myth that salt, at any level, is ―safe.‖
Today, the salt fight is alive once again. In October 2007, the
FDA announced a public hearing to ―share‖ its current sodium
policy, likely prompted by a CSPI citizen petition.52 Based on past
proceedings, it again appears that there is little chance that the
FDA will classify salt as a ―food additive.‖ The question, however,
is whether the FDA has done enough between 1978‘s FASEB
report and 2008 to provide accurate, helpful sodium content
information to American consumers.
This article argues that the answer is no, although progress has
been made. In 1984, the FDA adopted various ―health claim‖
regulations for sodium. 53 These rules allow manufacturers to place
the words ―sodium free,‖54 ―very low sodium,‖55 ―low sodium,‖56
―reduced sodium,‖57 ―no added salt,‖58 or ―light‖59 on food
51

Id.
Salt and Sodium, 72 Fed. Reg. 59,973 (proposed Oct. 23, 2007) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 86).
53
FDA Nutrient Content Claims for the Sodium Content of Foods, 21
C.F.R. § 101.61 (2008). But see Food Labeling, 49 Fed. Reg. 15510 (Apr. 18,
1984) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (noting only five claims).
54
21 C.F.R. § 101.61(b)(1) (defining ―sodium free‖ as, inter alia,
containing less than 5 milligrams (mg) of sodium per serving).
55
Id. at § 101.61(b)(2) (defining ―very low sodium‖ as generally less than
30–35 mg per serving, depending on the type of food labeled—per serving,
reconstituted, etc.).
56
Id. at § 101.61(b)(4) (defining ―low sodium‖ as, inter alia, 140 mg or
less of sodium per serving).
57
Id. at § 101.61(b)(6) (defining ―reduced sodium‖ foods as containing at
least 25% less sodium than the reference food).
58
Id. at § 101.61(c) (prohibiting the use of ―unsalted‖ or ―no salt added‖
unless no salt is added during processing, where the food would usually have
salt added, and requiring that the product carry the words ―not a sodium free
food‖ if the product does not meet the definition of ―sodium free‖).
59
The terms ―light‖ and ―lite‖ are also restricted to products that contain no
more than 50% of the sodium contained in the ―reference food.‖ Nutrient
Content Claims for ―Light‖ or ―Lite,‖ 21 C.F.R. § 101.56(c)(1) (2009). The
―reference food‖ is the regular version of a food. For example a ―light‖ tomato
soup must have no more than 50% of the sodium in the original. Id.
52
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packaging. In 1993, the FDA adopted further labeling requirements
for sodium. The most important of these requirements established a
reference value, commonly known to Americans who read labels
as the ―Daily Value,‖ which sets forth the recommended upper
threshold for daily sodium consumption. 60 This value is 2,400
milligrams of sodium per day61 for the average person.
Among countries with reference values, the American daily
value recommendation is one of the lowest.62 Nonetheless, CSPI
sought a further reduction of the daily value threshold to 1,500
milligrams 63 in its citizens‘ petition filed in November 2005—a
position that the American Medical Association (AMA) supports.64
The AMA‘s call for revocation of salt‘s GRAS designation is
striking because it signals that a major organization in the medicalscientific community believes that there is adequate evidence for
the FDA to limit the use of salt in processed foods.65 The AMA
also recommends that food manufacturers voluntarily reduce the

60

Nutrition Labeling of Food, 21 C.F.R §§ 101.9(c)(4), (c)(9) (2009);
Reference Daily Intakes and Daily Reference Values, 58 Fed. Reg. 2206, 2223–
2224 (Jan. 6, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (discussing various
proposed values for the daily intake of sodium). See generally Food Labeling
Revision, 58 Fed. Reg. 2079, 2176 (Jan. 6, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
101).
61
21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(9) (2009).
62
WHO SODIUM REPORT, supra note 36, at 15.
63
Id. at 19. However, the FDA‘s November 2007 public hearing
specifically excluded daily value from its scope because daily values are the
subject of other rulemaking. Salt and Sodium, 72 Fed.Reg. 59,973, 59,976
(proposed Oct. 23, 2007) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 86).
64
See 72 Fed.Reg. at 59,974 (―FDA is aware that other organizations are in
general agreement with some of the recommendations in CSPI‘s petition. For
example, at the July 2006 annual meeting of the American Medical Association
(AMA), the AMA announced recommendations, in the form of a report issued
by the AMA‘s Council on Science and Health, to the agency echoing many of
the regulatory actions suggested by CSPI . . . .‖); Barry D. Dickinson & Stephen
Havas, Reducing the Population Burden of Cardiovascular Disease by Reducing
Sodium Intake, 167 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1460, 1466 (2007) (noting AMA
report‘s conclusion that ―the most substantial benefit in reducing [systolic blood
pressure] was gained from reducing sodium intake from [2.3 g to 1.5 g] per
day‖).
65
See generally Dickinson & Havas, supra note 64.
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amount of sodium in processed foods by fifty percent. 66
Unsurprisingly, food manufacturers and industry groups
oppose the AMA‘s position and its supporters. General Mills, for
example, argued in its March 28, 2008 written testimony that salt‘s
GRAS designation was appropriate because ―[r]evocation (of
GRAS) is not supported by science‖ and ―the multi-functional
properties of salt (including product safety) make it particularly
difficult to determine appropriate ceilings across all product
categories.‖67 The National Restaurant Association similarly
offered: ―GRAS status is a scientific evaluation that must take
place within a well-defined legal framework. There is no basis for
revoking the present status of salt.‖68 Morton Salt suggested that
―FDA policies should emphasize dietary patterns rather than
singular nutrients‖ and that ―there is no magic bullet for sodium
reduction.‖69
C. Salt in the Twenty-First Century
What can we learn from the last fifty years of attempts to
regulate salt in the American food supply? First, the American
food supply has fallen victim to government‘s preference for
industry and consumption.70 These preferences leave the American
66

Id.
Letter from General Mills to FDA, Comments on Docket No. 2005P0450 Salt and Sodium (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.regulations.gov (search
―FDA-2007-0545-0044.1‖).
68
Letter from National Restaurant Association to FDA, Comment on
Docket No. 2005P-0450 (Mar. 25, 2008), http://www.regulations.gov (search
―FDA-2007-0545-0019.1‖).
69
Comprehensive Outline of Morton Salt to FDA, Public Hearing
Concerning FDA‘s Policies Regarding Salt (Nov. 20, 2007),
http://www.regulations.gov (search ―FDA-2007-0545-0030‖).
70
See generally MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE‘S DILEMMA 55 (2006)
(quoting farmer George Naylor: ―Agriculture‘s always going to be organized by
the government; the question is, organized for whose benefit? Now it‘s for
Cargill and Coca-Cola. It‘s certainly not for the farmer.‖ And I would add, not
for consumer health.); DEVRA DAVIS, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE WAR ON
CANCER 419–26 (2007). When recounting the political history of the artificial
sweetener aspartame, Davis comments that:
67
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consumer largely unaware of health dangers. For example, when
salt first received its GRAS status, manufacturers had just begun to
package salted potato chips (the chips were previously sold plain
with a salt packet in the bag). 71 In 2008, while a consumer may be
able to find ―low sodium‖ health claims on packaging, what about
the healthy teenager who buys a bag of Dill Pickle Flavor Lay‘s
Potato Chips? The packaging does not bear any ―negative‖
information, and the teenager must be perceptive enough to know
that a one-ounce serving (which accounts for one-sixth of the bag)
contains 15% of the daily recommended sodium intake. 72 If she
consumes the whole bag, she will also consume 90% of her daily
sodium intake. This dramatic example illustrates that while salt
itself has not changed, the use of the substance in the food supply
has. This alone should be a sufficient justification for the FDA to
reconsider GRAS. 73
While revocation of GRAS for salt may not be necessary, the
FDA must at least require more balanced, prominent health
information on processed food labels. The FDA must consider the
evolution of our food supply and the effects that this evolution has
had on human health. Salt provides just one example of myriad
ways in which our current regulatory scheme subtly promotes

[i]n January 1977, FDA Chief Counsel Richard Merrill made agency
history. He formally asked the U.S. Attorney‘s office to convene a
grand jury to decide whether to indict the major producer of aspartame,
G.D. Searle, for knowingly misrepresenting ―findings, concealing
material facts and making false statements‖ in aspartame safety tests.
That this investigation never happened speaks volumes about the
difficulty of acquiring independent information in commercially
valuable products.
DAVIS, supra, at 419–20.
71
Nibble.com, The History of Potato Chips, http://www.thenibble.com/
reviews/main/snacks/chip-history.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2009) (noting that
chips did not come pre-salted until the 1950‘s).
72
Fritolay.com, Nutrition Label of Dill Pickle Flavored Potato Chips,
http://www.fritolay.com/our-snacks/lays-dill-pickle-chips.html (last visited Feb.
3, 2009) (click on ―See Nutrition Label: Flip the bag‖).
73
Substances Generally Recognized as Safe, 62 Fed. Reg. 18,939 (Apr. 17,
1997) (making the distinction between the substance and its use in foods) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 170).
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overconsumption and misinformation. Manufacturers‘ ―health
claims‖ help consumers find and buy ―healthy‖ products without
the suggestion that perhaps the consumer would be better off in the
produce section. Why not include ―health claims‖ that help
consumers understand how to make better food choices, rather than
just ―positive‖ purchases of ―healthy‖ foods?
The reason is that our food economy does not support this
approach, nor does the FDCA or other food labeling laws and
regulations. As a capitalist society, our system‘s success depends
on consumption: buy more; eat more; buy it from a corporation;
eat it in your car on the way to the mall. While this approach has
been good for corporate America and the economy, it has been a
disaster for the American diet. The FDA would significantly
advance its mission of promoting and protecting the public health 74
if it required ―balanced‖ label information—mandatory ―high
sodium‖ instead of voluntary ―low sodium‖; mandatory ―heavy‖
instead of voluntary ―light.‖ This idea is not so far-fetched,
although it may seem so to Americans familiar with the FDA‘s
history.75
In the United Kingdom, the Food Standards Agency (FSA)
adopted a ―traffic light signpost‖ system in 2007. 76 The system—
currently voluntary—includes core information about calories, fat,
sugar and salt on the front of packaging. Other nutritional
information, such as calcium, must remain separate and comply
with other regulations. 77 The categories encompassed by the
system are assigned one of three levels of ―healthfulness,‖ each
designated by a color: green, amber or red.78 The intended result is
that consumers easily identify green light foods as more healthful

74

Presentation from U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Overview,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/fda101/sld001.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
75
See generally MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS 51–66 (rev. & expanded
ed. 2007); MICHELE SIMON, APPETITE FOR PROFIT 143–65 (Nation Books 2006).
76
FOOD STANDARDS AGENCY, FRONT-OF-PACK TRAFFIC LIGHT SIGNPOST
LABELING - TECHNICAL GUIDANCE (2007), available at http://www.food.gov
.uk/multimedia/pdfs/frontofpackguidance2.pdf.
77
Id. at 2–3.
78
Id. at 5–6.
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than red light foods, with yellow light foods requiring
moderation.79
Consumer research formed the basis of the FSA program, not
public hearings or pure politics.80 The agency found that
consumers wanted an easier way to determine the content of
processed foods, which they reported ―difficulty determining the
nutritional content of.‖81 It therefore specifically recommends
seven product types for stop light labels: ready-made sandwiches;
hot and cold prepared meals; burgers and sausages; pies, pastries
and quiches; breaded formed meat, such as chicken nuggets;
pizzas; and breakfast cereals. 82 Manufacturers can use the labels
more widely than these categories, and likely will do so if they are
successful in marketing products to consumers in accordance with
the recommendations.
The UK based the stop light label criteria on two sources:
European Union Regulation No. 1924/2006,83 recognizing that
health and nutrition claims must be regulated ―in order to ensure a
high level of protection for consumers and to facilitate their
choice‖84 of safe, healthy foods; and recommendations of the UK‘s
own Committee on Medical Aspects of Food and Nutrition Policy
(COMA) and Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition
(SACN).85
79

Food Standards Agency, Using Traffic Lights to Make Healthier Choices
3 (2007), available at http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/publication/food
trafficlight1107.pdf.
80
The FSA commenced an evaluation project, independently managed by
the Project Management Panel, with the goal of ―establish[ing] which
scheme(s), or elements of the scheme(s), best enable consumers to make
informed choices about the foods they purchase.‖ Food Standards Agency, The
Independent Evaluation Project, http://www.food.gov.uk/foodlabelling/sign
posting/signpostevaluation/pmpanel/evaluation/ (last visited Deb. 24, 2009). For
a catalogue of the panel‘s studies to date, see id.
81
Id. at 4.
82
Id.
83
Council Regulation 1924/2006, Nutrition and Health Claims Made on
Foods, 2007 O.J. (L12/3).
84
Id. at 1.
85
The Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition
is an advisory Committee of independent experts that provides advice
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The nutritional criteria for each color are similar to American
labeling guidelines. The sodium levels permitted in a green light
food are .30 grams per 100 gram serving, resembling the American
―sodium free‖ standard.86 Manufacturers label products containing
.3 to 1.5 grams of salt per serving with an amber marking (―low
salt‖), and products containing more than 1.5 grams per serving
with red. For fats, products labeled with a green light can have no
more than 3 grams of fat per 100 gram serving, just as the FDA
permits a ―low fat‖ label on foods that contain no more than 3
grams of fat.87 A yellow light food, by contrast, can have a fat
range of 3 to 20 grams, while a red light is used for foods that
either have greater than 20 grams of fat per 100 grams or 21 grams
of fat per portion.88 Significantly, the FDA has no equivalent of the
red light designation with respect to sodium or fats—products
containing more than 1.5 grams of sodium or 20 grams of fat per
serving carry no special label alerting consumers of that content. 89
to the Food Standards Agency and Department of Health as well as
other Government Agencies and Departments. Its remit includes
matters concerning nutrient content of individual foods, advice on diet
and the nutritional status of people. Members are appointed as
independent scientific experts on the basis of their specific skills and
knowledge. There are also two members to represent consumers.
Members are required to conduct themselves in accordance with the
Code of Conduct for Scientific Advisory Committees. Individuals are
required to declare conflicts of interest and during discussions they may
be disqualified at the Chairman‘s discretion from contributing to the
conclusions and recommendations of the Committee.
The SCAN replaces the Committee on Medical Aspects of Food and Nutrition
Policy (COMA), but COMA‘s prior work is still referenced in the FSA‘s stop
light guidelines. See Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition, Chairman‘s
Introduction, http://www.sacn.gov.uk/about_us/index.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2009).
86
Compare GRAS Safety Review of Sodium Chloride, 47 Fed. Reg.
26,590 26,591 (June 18, 1982), with FRONT-OF-PACK TRAFFIC LIGHT SIGNPOST
LABELING, supra note 76, at 6.
87
Nutrient Content Claims for Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of
Foods, 21 C.F.R. § 101.62 (2009).
88
FRONT-OF-PACK TRAFFIC LIGHT SIGNPOST LABELING, supra note 76, at
6.
89
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(C) (allowing manufacturers to petition to
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While the FSA program does not ―determine the design of
individual approaches,‖ it does provide stop light design advice
based on the consumer research used to develop the program. 90
The overarching message of the design guidance is that consumers
should be able to read the symbols easily and quickly. The
information advises consumers to eat mainly green and amber
foods, with red foods ―fine to eat . . . occasionally or as a treat, but
think about how often you choose it and how much of it you eat.‖91
The general government message to consumers about the program
is that ―[h]ealthy eating is all about getting the right overall
balance.‖92
While the European Commission rejected adopting the FSA‘s
approach for all of Europe, there has been a proposal to require at
least prominent, front-of-package labels for six key pieces of
nutritional information.93 The measures are energy (calories), total
fat, saturated fat, carbohydrates, sugars and salts. 94 The proposed
regulation‘s major purpose is making
nutrition labeling mandatory in the principal field of vision
of a food label. It allows for the development of best
practice in the presentation of nutrition information,
including alternative forms of expression of the nutrition
information in relation to overall daily nutrient

make positive health claims based on scientific evidence, but remaining silent on
labeling the negative attributes of foods).
90
FRONT-OF-PACK TRAFFIC LIGHT SIGNPOST LABELING, supra note 76, at
9.
91
USING TRAFFIC LIGHTS TO MAKE HEALTHIER CHOICES, supra note 79, at
3; see also Food Standards Agency, Using Traffic Lights to Make Healthier
Choices,
http://www.eatwell.gov/uk/foodlabels/trafficlights/?lang=en
(last
visited Jan. 31, 2009).
92
USING TRAFFIC LIGHTS TO MAKE HEALTHIER CHOICES, supra note 79, at
2.
93
Stephen Castle and Elisabeth Rosenthal, EU Plans Food Labels to Cut
Rates of Obesity, INT‘L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 30, 2008, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/30/europe/fat.php.
94
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the Provision of Food Information to Consumers, COM
(2008) 40 final (Jan. 30, 2008).
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requirements or graphical forms of presentation. 95
Even though some were disappointed that the EU declined the
traffic light system, the fact that the UK has successfully launched
the system and that the EU is contemplating label redesign should
alert American regulators and manufacturers that change is afoot.
One American supermarket chain has already launched a
program providing consumers with more information with the
intent to help them make healthier food choices. Hannaford
Company‘s ―Guiding Stars‖ is a program for ―nutritious shopping
made simple.‖96 An ―expert panel of scientists‖97 who evaluate
foods based on the most current scientific information, including
the 2005 Federal Dietary Guidelines for Americans, advises the
company‘s program. The panel then assigns one (good), two
(better), or three (best) stars to products. A product can also earn
no stars, indicating it is not a good dietary choice.98 These stars
allow consumers to pick foods with more vitamins, minerals, fiber,
and whole grains and less saturated fat, trans fat, cholesterol, added
sugars, and added salts. 99
Hannaford stores display the star system on the shelf for
consumers to easily view while shopping. The program‘s web
guide also details how products are evaluated, who evaluates them,
and how consumers benefit from the program. The program is
marketed as having six core attributes: it‘s easy, it‘s fun, it‘s fast,
it‘s good for you, it‘s grounded in science, and it‘s fair. 100 This
program is one that other food retailers will likely adopt and is a
powerful example of the private market providing additional
95

Id.
What is Guiding Stars?, supra note 30.
97
Hannaford, Scientific Advisory Panel, http://www.hannaford.com/
Contents/Healthy_Living/Guiding_Stars/scientific_advisory.shtml (last visited
Jan. 31, 2009).
98
Hannaford, How Guiding Stars Works, http://www.hannaford.com/
Contents/Healthy_Living/Guiding_Stars/how_guiding_stars_work.shtml
(last
visited Feb. 4, 2009).
99
What is Guiding Stars?, supra note 30.
100
Hannaford, Benefits of Guiding Stars, http://www.hannaford.com/
Contents/Healthy_Living/Guiding_Stars/benefits.shtml (last visited Feb. 4,
2009).
96
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information to the consumer.
However, the program also raises excellent questions about the
future of information in the food economy. Had the federal
government been more responsive to issues such as those
involving salt well before national organizations began to call for
rescinding GRAS, perhaps Guiding Stars would not be necessary.
Alternatively, perhaps a private labeling system will be more
trusted by consumers than politicized federal regulations. In any
event, the federal government should take note of the Guiding
Stars program and encourage more innovation in information
exchange between manufacturers and consumers. It already has a
starting point: The National Organic Program.
II. MORE FROM MARKETING PROGRAMS? THE NATIONAL ORGANIC
PROGRAM
The primary reason that I paid more than Mr. Conventional at
the grocery store was that I bought organic products.101 Should I
have? The National Organic Program (NOP) is simply a marketing
tool.102 As the program ages, it faces increasing criticism that it
misleads consumers who purchase organics for health or social
concerns.103 However, the USDA Organic symbol is not an icon of
health and purity, or even safety.
The NOP represents a positive innovation in promoting
consumer education. It marks a substantial step towards informing
consumers about the process by which their foods are made. 104 The
101

See National Organic Food Production Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6523
(2006); 7 C.F.R. Part 205 (2008).
102
USDA, NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM BACKGROUND INFORMATION
(Oct. 2002, updated Apr. 2008), available at www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/
getfile?dDocName=STELDEV3004443 (―The NOP is a marketing program
housed within the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service. Neither the OFPA nor
the NOP regulations address food safety or nutrition.‖).
103
See generally A. Bryan Endres, An Awkward Adolescence in the
Organics Industry: Coming to Terms with Big Organic and Other Legal
Challenges for the Industry’s Next Ten Years, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L., 17, 59
(2007); Michelle T. Friedland, You Call that Organic? The USDA’s Misleading
Food Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 379 (2005).
104
Hornstein, supra note 24, at 1551; see also M.L. Louriero et al.,
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objective standards, while not perfect as discussed below, at least
give consumers information that they can use not only to make
purchasing decisions, but to hold manufacturers accountable for
failing to meet certain standards.105 This feature of NOP is
extremely important to consumers, especially given the FDA‘s
position that genetically engineered foods are presumed safe under
the FDCA. 106 It also promotes economic efficiency because
consumers can find the products they want. In turn, their purchases
signal manufacturers that there is demand for organic products.
A. Marketing Logo Helps Consumers Avoid Genetically
Engineered Foods
The FDA‘s Notice in 1992 presuming that genetically
engineered foods were ―generally regarded as safe‖ was
controversial because many consumers believed then, and still do
today, that such foods are in fact unsafe. 107 The petitioners in
Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala challenged FDA‘s issuance of
the Notice, claiming that the Agency‘s position on genetically
engineered foods required rulemaking in accordance with the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.108 The court

Assessing Consumer Preferences for Organic, Ecolabeled, and Regular Apples,
26 J. OF AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 404, 413–14 (2002) (analyzing niche
market for eco-labeled apples when compared to organic or conventional apples
and concluding that the organic label may be preferable to an eco-label if
production costs are the same).
105
See infra notes 128–56 and accompanying text.
106
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed.
Reg. 22,984, 22,991 (Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs. May 29, 1992) (notice)
(―[C]onsumers must be informed, by appropriate labeling, if a food derived from
a new plant variety differs from its traditional counterpart such that the common
or usual name no longer applies to the new food, or if a safety or usage issue
exists to which consumers must be alerted.‖); see also 21 U.S.C. § 321(s)
(providing that any substance that becomes a compound of food is a food
additive).
107
Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000)
(granting defendant-FDA‘s motion for summary judgment on issues of
genetically engineered food‘s notice requiring rulemaking).
108
Id. at 172.
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rejected this argument, specifically finding that the FDA properly
classified the Notice as a ―policy statement‖ rather than a
substantive rule. 109 This was the proper outcome because the
FDA‘s Notice created no new binding rules for genetically
engineered foods and only served to clarify that the FDCA‘s
standard requirements for food additives apply equally to such
foods.110
The FDA‘s presumption that genetically engineered foods are
GRAS rested on its determination that ―the only substances added
to rDNA engineered foods are nucleic acid proteins, generally
recognized as not only safe but also necessary for survival.‖ 111
While the petitioners claimed that this position was contrary to
statute and that the FDA‘s Notice was ―arbitrary and capricious,‖
the court disagreed, reasoning that the petitioners failed to dispute
the FSA‘s position that nucleic acid proteins are GRAS. 112 Rather,
the petitioners argued that the safety of such proteins in genetically
engineered foods was unknown. 113 Reviewing the GRAS standard,
the court ultimately concluded that there was no scientific evidence
that the presumption of safety was unwarranted. 114 However, in
109

Id. (―A substantive rule, which must undergo a formal notice-andcomment process is a rule that ‗implement[s]‘ a statute and has ‗the force and
effect of law . . . [p]olicy statements, on the other hand, are statements issued by
an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency
proposed to exercise a discretionary power.‘‖ (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281, 302 n.29 (1979)).
110
See id. (―[T]he statement does not declare that transferred genetic
material will be considered GRAS; rather, it announces that such material is
presumed to be GRAS. This presumption of safety is rebuttable because the
FDA will require food additive petitions in cases where safety questions exist
sufficient to warrant formal pre-market review by FDA to ensure public health
protection.‖) (emphasis in original, internal citations and quotations omitted).
111
Id. at 176 (citing Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant
Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,990).
112
Id. at 177. The petitioner did not challenge the safety of nucleic acid
proteins, but rather attempted to argue that nucleic acid proteins may not be
GRAS when in genetically engineered foods. Id.
113
Id.
114
Alliance for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 178–79 (―To be generally
recognized as safe, a substance must meet two criteria: 1) it must have technical
evidence of safety, usually in published scientific studies, and 2) this technical
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2001, the FDA did replace the GRAS presumption with a rigorous
pre-market notice procedure.115 While that process is probably
somewhat reassuring to consumers who are aware of it, the fact
that manufacturers do not have to label genetically engineered
foods is not.116
Understanding that the FDA views genetically engineered
foods as materially the same as their conventional counterparts is
key to understanding how, as a consequence, consumers have no
leverage to demand labels disclosing the presence of genetically
engineered foods or ingredients.117 The determination of
materiality ―is a factual predicate to the requirement of
labeling.‖118 Unless the FDA classifies genetically engineered
foods as ―materially‖ different from their conventional
counterparts, the agency lacks the legal authority to require
labeling. 119 Accordingly, it allows genetically engineered foods to
be marketed for human consumption without labels disclosing the
presence of genetically engineered ingredients. This is so as long
as the genetically engineered ingredient passes the pre-market
procedure.120 Thus, when a genetically engineered food complies
with the pre-market procedure and the FDA approves it, consumers
have no legal argument that genetically engineered foods are
evidence must be generally known and accepted in the scientific community.
See 21 C.F.R. 170.30 (a-b) . . . .‖).
115
Pre-market Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706
(proposed Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192 and 592).
116
Einsiedel, supra note 3, at 232.
117
Alliance for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d. at 179 (―Plaintiffs fail to
understand the limitation on the FDA‘s power to consider consumer demand
when making labeling decisions because they fail to recognize that the
determination that a product differs materially from the type of product it
purports to be is a factual predicate to the requirement of labeling.‖).
118
Id.
119
Id. (―Only once materiality has been established may the FDA consider
consumer opinion to determine whether a label is required to disclose a material
fact.‖ Thus, ―if there is a [material] difference, and consumers would likely want
to know about the difference, then labeling is appropriate. If, however, the
product does not differ in any significant way from what it purports to be, then it
would be misbranding to label the product as different, even if consumers
misperceived the product as different.‖) (citation omitted).
120
Id.
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materially different from their conventional counterparts.121 There
is no indication that the FDA will change its approach to
genetically engineered foods because there is little scientific reason
to do so.122 Therefore, consumers must rely on voluntary labeling
of ―no genetically engineered ingredients‖ on foods or purchase
100% USDA Organic foods. This information is provided, though
not perfectly, by NOP labeling and standards.
Consumers can rely on the USDA Organic icon to indicate a
food producer has followed the NOP regulations that exclude use
of genetically engineered ingredients during production. 123
However, consumers cannot rely on the icon to indicate that food
is actually free of genetically engineered ingredients. 124 The NOP
regulations do not set a zero tolerance level for genetically
engineered substances or pesticides and tolerate unintentional

121

―Materially different‖ is a reference to 21 U.S.C. § 321(n). See Alliance
for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. at 178 (―21 U.S.C. § 321(n), grants the FDA
limited authority to require labeling. In general, foods shall be deemed
misbranded if their labeling ‗fails to reveal facts . . . material with respect to
consequences which may result from the use of the article to which the labeling
. . . relates under the conditions of use prescribed in the labeling . . . or under
such conditions of use as are customary or usual.‘ 21 U.S.C. § 321(n).‖).
122
There is no scientific evidence that genetically engineered foods that
have gone through the pre-market clearance process pose a safety risk to
humans. Genetically engineered foods are considered safe once they have FDA
approval for human consumption (or animal consumption if used in animal feed
for stock intended for human consumption). See Linda Bren, Genetic
Engineering: the Future of Foods?, FDA CONSUMER MAG. (2003), available at
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2003/603_food.html (―If a food does not meet
the safety standards, the FDA has the authority to take it off the market.‖); see,
e.g., FDA, List of Completed Consultations on Bioengineered Foods (Feb.
2009), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/biocon.html.
123
7 C.F.R. §§ 205.2, 205.105(e) (2009) (restricting the use of the ―100%
organic‖ label to foods produced without ―Excluded methods,‖ which are
defined as ―a variety of methods used to genetically modify organisms or
influence their growth and development by means that are not possible under
natural conditions . . . including . . . recombinant DNA technology.‖).
124
Friedland, supra note 103, at 397 (indicating that the standards only
govern the producer‘s intentional actions, and accordingly, a violation may not
occur even if an excluded substance is detected).
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exposure to excluded methods of production. 125 Additionally, if
certified products do not meet the NOP standards, then there is a
process to decertify the producer.126 However, there is no
affirmative requirement that foods labeled organic be tested for
compliance with the regulations.127
B. The USDA Organic Model Allows Consumers to Demand
Compliance
Given the criticism of NOP and consumer concerns over
genetically engineered foods and pesticide residue, it is somewhat
surprising that the first widely reported decertification process
involves milk production, rather than produce.128 Even more
interesting is that core issues of the case—non-compliant dairies
profiting from high organic milk prices but providing noncompliant organic milk to consumers—are primarily economic
rather than public health complaints. 129 For several years, the
Cornucopia Institute,130 a grassroots organization whose motto is
―Promoting Economic Justice for Family-Scale Farming,‖ has been
monitoring the organic dairy industry. 131 The organization‘s
mission is to protect smaller farms, so it was particularly interested
in whether larger scale organic dairies were indeed following NOP
regulations. Its research suggested that some large-scale operators

125

Id. However, courts have held producers liable for failure to prevent
commingling of foods that contaminated organic food supplies. See In re
Starlink Corn Prod. Liab. Lit., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 841–43 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(examining liability where genetically engineered corn not approved for human
consumption contaminated consumer food products).
126
See 7 C.F.R. § 205.405 (outlining the decertification process).
127
Friedland, supra note 103, at 391–97.
128
See infra notes 131–50 and accompanying text.
129
Since many consumers claim to buy organic for health reasons, it would
seem that ―purity‖ of organic products might have been the first well-known
case of non-compliance. Instead, Cornucopia‘s work focuses on the economic
impact that large-scale farming has on small, family operations. See Cornucopia
Institute, http://www.cornucopia.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
130
Id.
131
Id.
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were not.132
As a result, in November 2005 the Cornucopia Institute
complained to the USDA that Aurora Organic Dairy did not have
sufficient pasture to meet the NOP standards. 133 A subsequent
investigation by the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service‘s NOP
confirmed that Aurora was not in compliance with the NOP
regulations. 134 In April 2007, the USDA notified Aurora that it
would revoke its organic standard for its Platteville, Colorado
facility. 135 By August of that year, the USDA and Aurora entered
into a consent agreement requiring the facility to satisfy various
conditions and requiring Aurora to submit new organic systems
plans, as well as imposing a one-year probationary review
period.136
The agreement sets eight specific requirements. 137 Aurora must
allow lactating and dry (non-lactating) cows on pasture daily
during the growing season, 138 clarifying that lactation is not a stage
of production that would exempt cows from accessing
pasturage.139 Aurora must also reduce its herd size in relation to the
pasture size; the herd must be sized for four lactating cows per acre
132

ALAN KASTEL, CORNUCOPIA INSTITUTE, MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY
ORGANIC MILK 16–17 (2006), http://cornucopia.org/dairysurvey/Organic
DairyReport/cornucopia_milkintregrity.pdf.
133
USDA, Q&AS ON THE AURORA CONSENT AGREEMENT,
http://www.ams.usda.gov/ (search ―aurora consent agreement q&a,‖ click on
first entry) [hereinafter Q&AS ON THE AURORA CONSENT AGREEMENT]; see also
Press Release, USDA, Aurora Organic Dairy Signs Consent Agreement with
USDA‘s Agricultural Marketing Service (Aug. 29, 2007), http://www.usda.gov/
(click ―Newsroom,‖ click ―Latest Releases,‖ Choose ―August‖ and ―2007‖ from
dropdown options, click on ―Aug 29, 2007 Aurora Organic Dairy Signs Consent
Agreement with USDA‘s Agricultural Marketing Service‖).
134
Q&AS ON THE AURORA CONSENT AGREEMENT, supra note 133.
135
Consent Agreement M-005-06, ¶ 2 (Aug. 23, 2007), http://www.ams.
usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5063456&acct=nopgeninfo
[hereinafter Consent Agreement].
136
Id. ¶ 11–14.
137
Q & A‘S ON THE AURORA CONSENT AGREEMENT, supra note 133.
138
The growing season is generally considered to be May 1 through
September 30 in Platteville, Colorado. See Consent Agreement, supra note 135,
¶ 7(c); Q&AS ON THE AURORA CONSENT AGREEMENT, supra note 133.
139
Q & A‘S ON THE AURORA CONSENT AGREEMENT, supra note 133.
OF
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and five dry cows per acre.140 In addition, calves must be allowed
to remain at Platteville until they are weaned and ready for pasture,
which is usually around four to six months. 141 Aurora must also
remove certain cows that it improperly transitioned into the
organic herd.142
Moreover, non-compliance with any of the agreement‘s terms
during the one-year probationary period may trigger resumption of
the decertification process.143 Additional provisions include that
Aurora shall bear the costs both of inspection at its Platteville
facility, should the USDA choose to conduct one, and certification
resulting from full compliance with its obligations by October 15,
2008.144 However, these administrative requirements are not the
only challenge that Aurora must face.
In December 2007, Aurora became the defendant in a class
action suit for allegedly selling ―milk and milk products which it
purports to be organic—and for which it charges the higher organic
price—but which it produces without adherence to federal law.‖145
The multidistrict litigation has since been centralized in the Eastern
District of Missouri,146 and now names Wal-Mart, Safeway, Wild
Oats, Target, and Costco as co-defendants.147 The basic complaint
is that non-compliance with NOP while using the USDA Organic
label deceived consumers who paid the premium price. 148
The Aurora complaints illustrate how the improved exchange
of information empowers the consumer. The NOP standards are
140

Consent Agreement, supra note 135, ¶ 7(d), (e).
Id. ¶ 7(d).
142
Id. ¶ 7(a), (b).
143
Id. ¶13.
144
Id. ¶¶ 13(c), 14.
145
Complaint ¶ 2, West v. Aurora Dairy Corp., No. 07-02625 (D.C. Colo.
Dec. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Aurora Dairy Complaint].
146
Transfer Order, In re Aurora Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Mktg. & Sales
Practices Litig., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 20, 2008) (MDL No.
1907)).
147
Practice and Procedure Order Upon Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a) ¶ 1, In re Aurora Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Mktg. & Sales Practices
Litig., 4:08MD01907 ERW (Mar. 14, 2008) (MDL No. 1907); Schedule CTO-1,
Tag-Along Actions.
148
Aurora Dairy Complaint, supra note 145, ¶¶ 27–33.
141
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quite clear about pasturage and compliance timeframes for organic
dairies. 149 Cornucopia Institute did not need to engage in complex
testing or scientific analysis of Aurora‘s milk, as it could simply
rely on eyewitness reports of herd size and photographs to find
NOP violations.150
With the successful action against Aurora initiated, Cornucopia
has since filed additional NOP non-compliance complaints with
USDA. On February 16, 2005, it wrote to the NOP compliance
office that a certified organic dairy in California denied pasture
access for its 3000 head herd.151 Again, Cornucopia relied on
information from workers, but also from having other dairy
professionals simply drive by the facility on clear days and
observing no cows in the pasture.152 Whether this will result in
action against the farm remains to be seen, but the impact of
―watchdog‖ organizations will play an important role in the future
of NOP.
Cornucopia Institute has not limited its complaints to specific
farming operations. On May 10, 2008, it made a broader complaint
against Dean Foods and the influence of large corporations on
NOP.153 The phenomenon of large corporate players in the organic
market is a hot button issue for many, including consumers. 154
149

NOP‘s dairy provisions have been controversial from their inception.
Due to the high costs of converting conventional to organic dairies, the
regulations have certain provisions that attempt to cushion the financial impacts
of organic milk production at the cost, some believe, of the ―organic ideal.‖ See
Harvey v. Johanns, 494 F.3d 237 (1st Cir. 2007); Harvey v. Veneman, 396 F.3d
28, 33 (1st Cir. 2005).
150
See Cornucopia Institute, Aurora Factory Farm Photos,
http://www.cornucopia.org/index.php/horizon-factory-farm-photo-gallery/
aurora-factory-farm-photo-gallery/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2009); Letter from Will
Fantle, Codirector, The Cornucopia Institute to Phyllis Fong, USDA – Office of
Inspector General (Feb. 16, 2005), www.organicconsumers.org/artman2/
uploads/1/OIG_Letter.pdf.
151
Letter from Will Fantle, Codirector, The Cornucopia Institute to Eileen
Broomell, NOP Compliance, USDA (Feb. 16, 2005), http://www.cornucopia.
org/case-vander-eyk-jr-dairy-farm.
152
See id.
153
Letter from Will Fantleto Phyllis Fong, supra note 150.
154
Dr. Phillip Howard, Organic Industry Structure, https://www.msu.edu/~
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However, Cornucopia‘s complaint goes beyond the standard
philosophical ideal that organics are off-limits to large
corporations. The complaint demands an investigation into why,
unlike the investigation of Aurora and other organic dairies with
compliance problems, complaints against Dean‘s Horizon facility
in Idaho were ignored. The Cornucopia Institute called upon the
Inspector General ―to review this matter and determine why an
investigation never took place at Dean/Horizon‘s Idaho factory
farm [and] . . . to determine why the apparent double standard, in
terms of enforcement exists.‖155 It further cautioned that ―[t]he
integrity of the organic label and the integrity and reputation of the
USDA are at stake.‖156
Lawmakers should take note of Cornucopia‘s complaints, as
well as the class action related to the information revealed in those
complaints. These activities demonstrate that consumers, when
provided with enough information, can and will proactively
demand that food meets its labeled standard.
IV. CONCLUSION
NOP serves as an excellent illustration of how transparent
information influences the marketplace. While NOP still has a long
way to go to educate consumers about what ―USDA Organic‖
means, it is on the right path. The FDA should take notice of how a
marketing program can provide information consumers want,
while also balancing the needs of producers. If the FDA did take
notice, it might be inclined to follow the UK‘s traffic light label
examples noted above.157
Optimizing information in the food economy is no simple task.
As labeling analysts have noted, ―as with any policy, the costs and
benefits of government intervention in labeling must be weighed,
and the sometimes conflicting demands of economic efficiency,
consumer and producer concerns, public opinion, political
howardp/organicindustry.html (presenting various charts showing ownership of
organic food companies) (last visited Feb. 5, 2008).
155
Letter from Will Fantle to Phyllis Fong, supra note 150, at 2–3.
156
Id. at 3.
157
See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text.
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expediency, and current events must be sorted and evaluated.‖158
The circumstances surrounding the UK, Hannaford, and the NOP
all illustrate how information exchange can change consumers‘
view and power in the marketplace. Conversely, the American
milk controversy illustrates how limiting information leads to
misinformed consumers and market inefficiencies.
Better information exchange in the food economy also leads to
better data for manufacturers and policy makers. The traffic light
label system, for example, links scientific evidence of healthy
eating habits with a simple way to signal consumers how to eat
healthily. The real test of that system, as well as Hannaford‘s
Guiding Stars, is whether purchasing patterns will be altered. If
consumers purchase and demand more ―green light‖ or ―three star‖
options, manufacturers can produce more products to meet that
demand. Should consumer patterns not be altered or should they
prove that ―red light‖ or no star options remain popular, there is
then a signal to government that its health message is not clear, or
that people do not care to manage their health. If it is the former,
then government has information that can help it better allocate its
educational resources. If it is the latter, then lawmakers and policy
analysts must grapple with how to allocate the costs of
irresponsible citizens.
The food economy is a complex mix of law and economics,
among other things. In the current food economy, law trumps
economics in the sense that the constraints of the FDCA, FTC,
USDA, and even commercial speech govern what information
most consumers receive. Given the decline of public health as a
result of obesity and environmental troubles related to agriculture,
one can only imagine that the information exchange between food
manufacturers and consumers is accelerating the ―race to the
bottom‖ that Akerlof predicts whenever there is asymmetric
information. 159 While economic modeling is valuable to proving
the phenomenon, rebalancing the flow of information in the food
economy will require lawmakers to revisit our currently regulatory
scheme. The sooner, the better.
158
159

Golan, supra note 3, at 1.
See discussion supra note 8.
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Appendix A: The Shopping List160

My Purchases/Per
Serving Nutritional
Information
Kashi Pesto Pasta
Calories 290
Sodium 750 mg
Fat 11 grams
Sugars 4 grams
Olivia‘s Organic Salad
Calories 15
Sodium 60 g
Fat 0 g
Sugars 0g

Total
Front Pack Label
Cost/Package
Information/Claims
Size/Serving
$3.99/10 ounces All Natural
/One Serving

Zinfandel Low Fat
Vinaigrette
Calories 60
Sodium 480 mg
Fat 2.5 g
Sugars 7 g

$3.99/8
ounces/2
tablespoons (29
grams)

Low Fat

Store Brand Organic
Milk
Calories 90
Sodium 130 mg
Fat 0 g
Sugars 12 g
Late July Dark
Chocolate Sandwich
Cookies
Calories 150
Sodium 125 mg
Fat 6 g
Sugars 9 g

$3.99/ half
gallon/8 ounce
glass

USDA Organic

$3.99/ 8.2
ounces/ 3
cookies (33
grams)

USDA Organic

160

$3.99/ 5 ounces/ USDA Organic
2 cups (85
grams)

All prices surveyed on July 10, 2008 at Shaw‘s Supermarket and
Concord Co-op Market in Concord, New Hampshire, USA.
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TOTALS
Calories 605
Sodium 1545 mg
Fat 19.5 g
Sugars 32 g
Mr. Conventional’s
Purchases/Nutritional
Information
Progresso Soup Rich n‘
Hearty Steak and
Russett Potato
Calories 140 (280)
(whole can)
Sodium 990 (1980) mg
Fat 1.5 (3.0) g
Sugars 3 (6) g
Iceberg Salad Mix
Calories 15
Sodium 0 g
Fat 0 g
Sugars 2 g
Creamy Greek Dressing
Calories 160
Sodium 160 mg
Fat 16 g
Sugars 3 g
Store Brand Whole
Milk
Calories 150
Sodium 125 mg
Fat 8 g
Sugars 12 g
Oreos
Calories 160
Sodium 190 mg
Fat 7g
Sugars 14g
TOTALS

529

Total Cost
$19.95

Total
Cost/Package
Size/Serving
$1.89/ 18.5
ounces/ ½ Can
(246 grams)

Front Pack Label
Information/Claims

$2.29/ 16
ounces/ 1.5
cups (85 grams)

None

$3.99/8
ounces/2
tablespoons (29
grams)

None

$2.50/ half
gallon/ 1 cup

None

$2.50/18
ounces/ 34
grams – no
cookie number
listed
Total Cost

None

None
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Calories 625
Sodium 1465 mg
Fat 32.5 g
Sugars 34 g

$13.17

